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Competition has been modelled in the literature in a number of
ways. What do these di¤erent parametrizations of competition have in
common? For instance, it turns out that it is not always the case that a
rise in competition reduces price cost margins, industry wide pro…ts or
concentration. All parametrizations of competition, considered here,
have two features in common. First, the reallocation e¤ect: a rise in
competition raises the pro…ts of a …rm relative to the pro…ts of a less
e¢cient …rm. Second, a rise in competition reduces the pro…ts of the
least e¢cient …rm active in the industry.
Keywords: competition, measures of competition, concentration,
price cost margin, pro…ts
JEL classi…cation: D43, L13
1 Introduction
What is competition? More than two hundred years after Adam Smith we
still don’t know. In many countries competition is at the top of the policy
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agenda. To illustrate, much is made of the rise in competition in the EU due
to the single market and the single currency. Also, an argument often used in
favor of privatization is that it intensi…es competition between …rms. In the
economics literature, competition is a prominent concept. See for instance
the literature on competition and managerial incentives (Hart (1983), Her-
malin (1992), Schmidt (1997)), the theoretical literature on competition and
innovation (Aghion et al. (1995), Martin (1993)) and the empirical literature
on these subjects (Baily and Gersbach (1995), Blundell et al. (1995), Nickell
(1996)). Yet, a coherent de…nition or robust measurement of competition
does not exist.
The lack of a coherent framework can be illustrated by the following
division in the literature. On the one hand, the theoretical literature has
parametrized competition in a number of ways, including a reduction in en-
try barriers, a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition and a rise in the
substitution elasticity between …rms’ goods. On the other hand, the empirical
literature has measured competition with variables like industry concentra-
tion, price cost margins and pro…ts. As shown below for the realistic case
where …rms di¤er in their marginal cost levels, these two views of competi-
tion ‡atly contradict each other. As an illustration, increasing competition
through a rise in the number of …rms in the industry (as Martin (1993) does)
reduces industry concentration. However, increasing competition through
a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition (as it is parametrized in
Aghion et al. (1995)) raises industry concentration.
This division in the literature raises two questions. First, is there common
ground in such theoretical parametrizations of competition? More precisely,
is there a variable which is monotone in each of these parametrizations? Sec-
ond, if so, can this variable be used to bridge the gap between the theoretical
and empirical literature? That is, can this variable be used to measure com-
petition empirically?
I show that in a number of simple examples (in total nine di¤erent
parametrizations of competition), there is the following common ground.
Competition always raises the pro…ts of a …rm relative to the pro…ts of a less
e¢cient …rm. This is called the reallocation e¤ect of competition. Also, a
rise in competition reduces the pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm active in the
market.1 These two e¤ects together imply the selection e¤ect of competition,
which is described by Vickers (1995:p. 13) as ‘when …rms’ cost di¤er, com-
petition can play an important role in selecting more e¢cient …rms from less
1In case competition is raised through increasing the number of …rms in the market,
the least e¢cient …rm is identi…ed as the least e¢cient …rm before entry. I return to this
below.
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e¢cient ones’.2 Moreover, in these examples a rise in competition can both
increase and decrease variables like industry concentration, total industry
pro…ts and …rms’ price cost margins.
The idea behind examining relative pro…ts is that a market maps marginal
cost di¤erentials between …rms into pro…t di¤erentials. The more competitive
the market is, the steeper this mapping becomes in the sense that a given cost
di¤erential is mapped into a bigger pro…t di¤erential. In a more competitive
environment, …rms are punished more severely (in terms of pro…ts) for a drop
in e¢ciency.
The intuition for these e¤ects can be seen in terms of market transparency.
As the market becomes more transparent, consumers see more clearly which
…rms o¤er high value at a low price. As a consequence, consumers buy more
from these e¢cient …rms at the expense of ine¢cient …rms. Therefore, the
pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm decline. In other words, a lack of transparency
or competition protects the least e¢cient …rm from its opponents. Further,
the rise in competition may or may not reduce the pro…ts of the most e¢cient
…rms in the industry. If it reduces all …rms’ pro…ts, high cost …rms lose
relatively more pro…ts than low cost …rms. But there is a possibility that the
most e¢cient …rms in the industry experience a rise in pro…ts, because the rise
in competition enables them to use their cost advantage more aggressively.
Given that relative pro…ts are monotone in a number of well known the-
oretical parametrizations of competition, can this be used to bridge the gap
between the theoretical and empirical literature? Compared to other em-
pirical measures of competition used (reviewed in section 7), estimating the
degree to which cost di¤erentials are mapped into pro…t di¤erentials has two
main advantages and one disadvantage. First, this measure of competition is
monotone in competition for di¤erent parametrizations of competition. Sec-
ond, the measure can be estimated using observations of only a subset of
the …rms in the industry. This is useful as panel data sets (including only
a subset of …rms in the industry) are becoming more common in empirical
industrial organization. Finally, the main disadvantage is that an estimate
is needed of di¤erences in …rms’ marginal cost levels.
The literature on measures of competition is reviewed below. Here I
only mention Hay and Liu (1997) who use a measure which is based on the
reallocation of revenues, instead of the reallocation of pro…ts. Their idea is
that in a more competitive industry, a given rise in relative marginal costs
leads to a bigger fall in marketshare. Although I view their measure of
2Note that the reallocation e¤ect is necessary but not su¢cient for the selection e¤ect
because it does not exclude the case where a rise in competition raises each …rm’s pro…ts.
If this case is not excluded, more intense competition could invite ine¢cient …rms to enter.
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competition and the one proposed here as complementary, I show that some
but not all parametrizations of competition satisfy this revenue reallocation
e¤ect.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de…nes the com-
mon ground of di¤erent parametrizations of competition. Section 3 presents
examples of parametrizations of competition and shows that these examples
have indeed the reallocation and selection e¤ects in common. In section 4, I
argue that a necessary condition for a variable to measure competition is that
it is monotone in well known parametrizations of competition. It turns out
that some measures of competition used in the literature are not monotone in
the competition parametrizations in section 3. Section 5 discusses why a rise
in competition does not necessarily reduce concentration, industry wide prof-
its or each …rm’s price cost margin. Section 6 discusses brie‡y some problems
that one can encounter when using relative pro…ts to measure competition
in practice. Section 7 reviews the literature on measures of competition and
section 8 concludes. All proofs of the results can be found in the appendix.
2 Competition: the common ground
Competition is a concept that is often used in economics. And economists
attribute a number of properties to this concept. Examples are the following.
A rise in competition is associated with a decrease in concentration in an
industry, with a decrease in each …rm’s pro…ts or total industry pro…ts. These
properties of competition turn out to be correct for some parametrizations
of competition, but not for others.
This leaves open the question whether these parametrizations of compe-
tition have something in common at all. In this paper, I consider a number
of simple examples with nine parametrizations of competition. Three e¤ects
of competition turn out to be robust over each of these parametrizations.
Clearly, I cannot prove that these e¤ects hold for all possible parametriza-
tions of competition. However, the intuition for these e¤ects is compelling
enough that my conjecture is that these e¤ects do hold for each parametriza-
tion of competition. The conjecture introduces two conditions which are
discussed at the end of this section.
Conjecture 1 If …rms are completely symmetric except for their marginal
cost levels (only) and if …rms choose their strategic variables simultaneously
and independently, then a rise in competition
(i) reduces the pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm in the market,
(ii) increases the pro…ts of any …rm relative to pro…ts of a less e¢cient …rm
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in the market and
(iii) (weakly) increases total variable costs of any …rm relative to total variable
costs of a less e¢cient …rm.
Note that e¢ciency is used here in terms of marginal costs. The least
e¢cient …rm is the …rm i with the highest marginal costs, ci.3 Further,
pro…ts are de…ned here as revenue minus total variable costs. Throughout
this paper I assume that …rms have constant marginal costs. Hence total
variable costs equal marginal costs times output.
The …rst e¤ect is familiar. It implies, for instance, that a rise in compe-
tition reduces each …rm’s pro…ts if all …rms have the same marginal costs.
The second e¤ect is the pro…t reallocation e¤ect of competition. These two
e¤ects imply the selection e¤ect of competition: a rise in competition sepa-
rates e¢cient from ine¢cient …rms by reducing ine¢cient …rms’ pro…ts and
thus forcing them to exit. The third e¤ect is a reallocation e¤ect in terms of
total variable costs. A rise in competition raises total variable costs of a …rm
relative to the total variable costs of a less e¢cient …rm.
A rise in competition reallocates output from ine¢cient to e¢cient …rms
because it allows e¢cient …rms to use their cost advantage more aggressively.
Low cost …rms have lower prices and hence attract more customers as com-
petition is intensi…ed. This reallocation of output from ine¢cient to e¢cient
…rms raises variable costs of a …rm relative to variable costs of a less e¢-
cient …rm. Further, this reallocation of output raises the pro…ts of e¢cient
…rms relative to ine¢cient …rms. This does not necessarily imply that the
pro…t level of an e¢cient …rm rises. If, due to the more competitive envi-
ronment, the pro…ts of an e¢cient …rm decrease, the pro…ts of less e¢cient
…rms decrease faster.
It is important to distuingish three di¤erent ways in which competition
can be increased in an industry. These are summarized in table 1, with their
respective parametrizations in the examples below.
3Implicitly, I assume that there is no vertical product di¤erentiation, that is consumers’
valuation of product i, vi, is the same for each product. If one would allow for vertical
product di¤erentiation, …rm i is more e¢cient than j if and only if vi ¡ ci > vj ¡ cj .
Although this extension is trivial theoretically, empirically it is hard to get estimates of
vi. This adds to the problem of estimating e¢ciency di¤erences between …rms, discussed
below.
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competition becomes more intense as: parametrized as:
1. number of …rms in the industry rises * f #(and hence n ") in example 1
2. interaction between …rms becomes * ¸ #; b
d
#; a # in example 1
more aggressive * µ " in examples 2,4,5
* a switch from Cournot to
Bertrand competition in
example 3.
3. costs are reduced * cj # in example 1
Table 1. parametrizations of competition
In example 1, the number of active …rms n in the industry is raised
through a fall in the exogenous entry cost f . Most economists would iden-
tify this as a rise in competition. It is useful to distinguish such a rise in
competition from the case where competition is increased through more ag-
gressive interaction between …rms. Examples of more aggressive interaction
are a decrease in the conjectural variation (see for instance Bresnahan (1989)
and Hay and Liu (1997)), …rms’ products becoming closer substitutes and a
switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition. A rise in competition through
more aggressive interaction can lead to a fall in the number of …rms in the
market, through the selection e¤ect. In other words, observing a fall in the
number of …rms in an industry can be caused by either a fall in competition
(an increase in the entry cost) or a rise in competition (more aggressive in-
teraction between …rms). Finally, a …rm is said to be in a more competitive
environment if it faces opponents with lower costs. In other words, if a high
cost …rm is replaced by a low cost …rm, then the industry is called more com-
petitive. This is captured by the last form of competition related to a …rm’s
opponents’ cost levels. For instance, a rise in competition faced by domestic
…rms in their home market due to reductions in import tari¤s (per unit of
output) paid by their foreign competitors can be modelled in this way. A
reduction in the tari¤ foreign …rms have to pay is equivalent to a reduction
in their marginal production costs.
In each of the examples below, competition is increased through one chan-
nel only. That is, I do not consider the case where more aggressive interaction
or reducing a …rm’s cost level leads some …rms to exit through the selection
e¤ect. The reason is that it is unclear what has happened to competition in
this case. That is, the exit of …rms may (or may not) outweigh the initial rise
in competition through more aggressive interaction and overall competition
may4 (or may not) be reduced. Separating these e¤ects turns out to be more
4A simple way to illustrate this is Sutton’s (1991: 33) example. Consider a market
with two potential entrants which are identical, that is the …rms have the same constant
marginal costs and produce the same product. To enter each has to pay a positive sunk
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instructive. In particular, the separate analysis shows in which sense a rise
in competition (1) through a rise in the number of active …rms, (2) through
more aggressive interaction and (3) through reducing a …rm’s opponents’ cost
levels are similar. In each case, the rise in competition reduces the pro…ts of
the least e¢cient …rm in the market and features the reallocation e¤ect in
terms of pro…ts and total variable costs.
Let me specify what the conjecture implies if competition is increased
through a rise in the number of …rms in the market and through a reduction
in costs. Consider the case where the n most e¢cient …rms are in the market.
Entry barriers are lowered and …rm n+1 enters the market, which is now the
least e¢cient …rm in the market. Clearly, as n + 1’s pro…ts and costs have
increased from 0 to some positive value, claims (i)-(iii) in the conjecture
do not apply to n + 1. In this case the conjecture should be interpreted
as applying to the ex ante least e¢cient …rm, say I with cI ¸ ci for each
i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng. It is shown below that the addition of …rm n + 1 to the
market, reduces …rm I’s pro…t level and raises pro…ts and variable costs of
more e¢cient …rms relative to I. Similarly, if competition in the industry is
increased through lowering the least e¢cient …rm’s marginal cost level, the
conjecture applies to the one but least e¢cient …rm in the industry.
The conditions in the conjecture that …rms are symmetric except for their
marginal cost levels and that they choose their strategic variables simulta-
neously and independently5 are important, as the following counterexample
shows.
Counterexample Consider two …rms, denoted 1 and 2, where …rm i
(= 1; 2) faces demand of the form p(xi; xj) = 1 ¡ xi ¡ µxj with i 6= j and
0 < µ <
p
2, where the upperbound on µ is needed to allow for an equilib-
rium with two active …rms. Firm i has constant marginal costs ci. Suppose
…rm 1 has a …rst mover advantage: …rm 2 chooses output level x2 after ob-
entry cost. If there is Cournot competition in the product market, both …rms enter if
the sunk cost is not too high. If competition intensi…es through a switch from Cournot
to Bertrand competition, at most one …rm can pro…tably enter. This …rm charges the
monopoly price. In this case, the switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition reduces
overall competition.
5Also, when considering collusion outcomes with side payments, the following model
contradicts the reallocation e¤ect. Consider the case of a duopoly where …rm 1 is far more
e¢cient than 2. They determine the output allocation that maximizes joint pro…ts and
(Nash) bargain to split the surplus. Suppose …rm 1 has all the bargaining power. This
implies that …rm 2 receives a payo¤ equal to its outside option which equals the competitive
outcome. In this case, a rise in competition caused by a move from the collusion outcome
to the competitive outcome has no e¤ect on the ine¢cient …rm’s pro…ts. At the same
time, the pro…ts of the more e¢cient …rm 1 fall due to the rise in competition.
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serving 1’s choice x1. In this example, µ can be used as a parametrization
of competition. That is, competition becomes more intense as goods become
closer substitutes (µ rises). As shown in the appendix, it follows for c1 = 0:4,
c2 = 0:35 and µ = 1:1 that
d¼1(c1;c2;µ)
dµ
> 0 while d¼2(c2;c1;µ)
dµ
< 0. In words,
a rise in competition decreases the pro…ts of the low cost …rm while it in-
creases the pro…ts of the high cost …rm because the latter has a …rst mover
advantage. Hence results (i) and (ii) of the conjecture no longer hold.
The idea of the counterexample is that a rise in competition also a¤ects
the …rst mover advantage. Although more intense competition makes the
cost disadvantage of …rm 1 more pronounced, it also increases the bene…t
of 1’s …rst mover advantage. Hence, marginal cost is no longer a su¢cient
statistic for the relative competitive position of a …rm if there is an unlevel
playing …eld, as here in the timing of …rms’ moves.
The asymmetries excluded by the conjecture are asymmetries that a¤ect
…rms’ behavior at the margin. So the conjecture still holds if, for instance,
…rms di¤er in their levels of …xed costs. A …rm’s level of …xed costs a¤ects
its entry decision. But once it is in the market, a change in competition will
have the e¤ects described in the conjecture.6
3 Examples
A parameter of competition is an exogenous variable which determines how
competitive the industry is. It is the exogeneity of these variables that makes
them a natural starting point of the analysis.7 This section considers ex-
amples of parameters that the literature has interpreted as determinants of
competition. It concludes with a proposition showing that conjecture 1 holds
for each of these parametrizations of competition.
Empirical measures of competition are based on endogenous variables like
…rms’ pro…ts and revenues. The next section introduces measures like rela-
tive pro…ts, the Her…ndahl index and price cost margins. Then it is analyzed
how the parametrizations of competition below a¤ect these measures of com-
6Note, though, that with asymmetries in …xed costs, parts (i) and (ii) of the conjecture
do not necessarily imply the selection e¤ect of competition. Consider the case of a duopoly
where …rm 1 has lower marginal costs than …rm 2 but higher …xed costs. Further, assume
that 1’s pro…ts (gross of …xed costs) equal its …xed costs, while 2’s pro…ts exceed its …xed
costs. Then a rise in competition which reduces both …rms’ pro…ts forces the more e¢cient
…rm in terms of marginal costs (…rm 1) to exit.
7More precisely, these variables are exogenous in the examples below. One could con-




Example 1 Consider the following two stage game. In the …rst stage
…rms decide simultaneously and independently whether to enter an industry
or not. Entering the industry costs a …xed entry fee f . In the second stage,
the …rms that have entered choose simultaneously and independently their
output level. All …rms know which …rms enter and what each …rm’s constant
marginal cost level is.
This two stage game can be solved by backward induction. First, the second
stage is solved assuming n …rms enter, then in the …rst stage n is determined.
Assume that …rm i in the second stage faces a demand curve of the form











with a > ci > 0 and 0 < d  b. I write the …rst order condition as
a¡ 2bxi ¡ d
X
j 6=i
xj ¡ ¸dxi ¡ ci = 0 (1)




is the conjectural variation. In words, ¸ measures the
belief of …rm i about how its opponents will react to a change in its own
output level. For instance, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium assumes ¸ = 0.
This parameter ¸ can be seen as a parametrization of competition. The lower
¸, the more softly a …rm expects its opponents to react to a rise in its output
level. Hence the more aggressively (in the sense of higher output levels) the
…rm will behave. Assuming all n …rms produce positive output levels, one






















Further, rewriting equation (1) as
a¡ bxi ¡ d
X
j 6=i
xj ¡ ci = (b+ ¸d)xi
allows one to write the pro…ts of …rm i as




and the price of …rm i as
pi = (b+ ¸d)xi + ci (4)
Then moving back to the …rst stage, one can determine the number of …rms
in the industry n by the conditions that
¼n ¸ f
¼n+1 < f
Within this model, there are …ve parameters that a¤ect how competitively
…rms behave. First, as explained above, a lower value of ¸ implies more
competitive behavior by …rms. Second, the ratio d
b
measures how close sub-
stitutes the goods are. If d = b then goods are perfect substitutes, for d < b
…rms have some monopoly power due to product di¤erentiation. Thus, a
rise in d
b
is interpreted as a rise in competition. Third, a fall in
P
cj makes
the industry more competitive as a …rm faces competitors with lower costs.
Fourth, a rise in the exogenous entry fee f reduces the number of active …rms
in the industry and hence reduces competition. Finally, for given number of
…rms in the market, a rise in a has the same e¤ects as a rise in monopoly
power. This can be seen as follows. Writing pro…ts of …rm n + 1 minus the




































it is clear that ¼n+1 ¡ f is homogenous of degree 1 in (a; b; d; f; c1; c2; :::).
That is, changing all these parameters with the same multiple leaves the
entry decision of …rm n + 1 unchanged. Raising the intercept a while as-
suming that …rm n+ 1 stays out is in this sense equivalent to assuming that
(b; d; f; c1; c2; :::) have all risen with the same factor. This leaves bd unchanged
but raises f and
P
cj. As explained above, this is interpreted as a fall in
competition. In this sense, a rise in a for given number of …rms in the indus-
try decreases competition.
Example 2 Consider two …rms, denoted 1 and 2, that face demand of the





with i 6= j and 0 < µ < 1. This demand function is




µ , where µ measures
the degree of substitutability between the goods of …rm 1 and 2. Firm i has
marginal costs ci. I say that competition is increased as goods become closer
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¶µ!2 with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j. De…ning the cost gap between i
and j as c ´ ci
cj
the pro…ts of …rm i equal
¼(c; µ) =
1 + (1¡ µ)cµ
(1 + cµ)2
(7)
Example 3 Consider the same set up as in the previous example with
homogenous goods, that is µ = 1. I analyze the e¤ects of a change in compe-
tition through a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition in the market,
where Bertrand competition is often seen as more competitive than Cournot
competition. With Cournot competition the expressions for output xCi , price
pCi and pro…ts ¼
C
i can be found in the example above with µ = 1. To derive
the expressions for Bertrand competition, assume that c1 < c2. Then …rm 1
chooses limit price pB = c2 to reduce …rm 2’s output level to 0. It follows









while …rm 2’s output and pro…t level are equal to 0.
Example 4 Consider the following Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic
competition. Firm i faces an inverse demand function of the form pi(xi) =
Ax
¡(1¡µ)







!1¡µ as given. The idea
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is that the number of …rms n is so big that the e¤ect of …rm i’s actions
on A are negligible. This is the main di¤erence with example 2 where the
duopolists do take the e¤ects of their actions on A into account. This demand







where 0 < µ < 1 measures the degree of substitutability between the goods































Finally, i’s pro…ts equal














As in example 2, competition is parameterized here through µ.
Example 5 Consider an Hotelling beach of length 1 with consumers
distributed uniformly over the beach with density 1. Firm 1 is located on
the far left of the beach and …rm 2 on the far right. A consumer at position
x 2 h0; 1i who buys a product from …rm 1 incurs a linear travel cost tx,
and if she buys from …rm 2 she incurs travel cost t(1¡x). Assume that each
consumer buys one and only one product. Firm i has constant marginal costs






. As travel costs decrease, consumers are more inclined to buy from
the cheapest …rm rather than the closest one. So as travel costs decrease,
…rms’ monopoly power is reduced and competition is higher. Parametrizing
competition as µ = 1
t













+ 2ci + cj) (14)
Finally, the pro…ts of …rm i equal
¼(ci; cj ; µ) =
(3=µ + cj ¡ ci)2
18=µ
(15)
with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j.
Proposition 2 Claims (ii) and (iii) in conjecture 1 hold for all examples
above. Claim (i) holds for each example above, if upperbounds ¹̧;¹b > 0 are
imposed on ¸ and b respectively in example 1.
This shows the sense in which conjecture 1 is robust to di¤erent parametriza-
tions of competition. It holds for all examples in this section. The reason
for the upperbounds ¹̧;¹b needed for claim (i) is the following. Recall that
¸ denotes …rm i’s expectation of its opponents’ output response to a rise in
i’s own output level. Hence a high value of ¸ makes …rm i reluctant to raise
output. Equation (2) implies that lim¸!+1 xi = 0. As a benchmark, con-
sider a multi-product monopolist faced with the same demand structure and
n plants where plant i produces product i with marginal costs ci. For ¸ large
enough and d < b, it is the case that each …rm i produces less than the multi-
product monopolist would produce with plant i. In this case a reduction in
¸, which is interpreted as a rise in competition, raises each …rm’s output
and pro…t levels. Hence this reduction in ¸ raises the least e¢cient …rm’s
pro…ts. To avoid this (extreme) case, where output is below the multi-plant
monopolist’s output, an upperbound on ¸ is needed.8 Since the parameters b
and ¸ enter symmetrically (for given d) in the expression for pro…ts (3) (and
output(2)), the same reasoning applies to the upperbound on b.
Although the proposition shows that the conjecture is fairly robust to
di¤erent parametrizations of competition, it is important to note that all
parametrizations have three important assumptions in common. First, each
…rm produces one good with constant marginal costs. This avoids problems
8Alternatively, one can argue that a reduction in ¸ (or b) which increases the least
e¢cient …rm’s pro…ts should not be interpreted as a rise in competition. In that case, ¸
is de…ned as a parameter of competition only for values satisfying ¸ < ¹̧.
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like (dis)economies of scale and scope and how to allocate costs to certain
activities. Second, …rms choose their strategic variables simultaneously and
independently. This excludes from the analysis issues like collusion,9 merg-
ers, predation and …rst mover advantages. Finally, …rms compete with a
one dimensional variable. That is, I do not consider the case where, for in-
stance, …rms choose both the price level and the amount spent on advertising.
This makes the e¢ciency comparison of two …rms unambiguous, because it
excludes the possibility that one …rm is more e¢cient in producing output
while the other is more e¢cient in generating sales through advertising.
4 Measures of competition
Proposition 2 shows that relative pro…ts, relative variable costs and the prof-
its of the least e¢cient …rm are monotone in competition for the examples in
section 3. This section shows that this is not true for the Her…ndahl index,
total rents in an industry, relative revenues nor for the price cost margin,
each of which has been used in the literature to measure competition (see
section 7). Moreover, relative pro…ts and relative variable costs are mono-
tone in competition even if only a strict subset of …rms in the industry is
observed.
Within the simple framework of this paper, where each …rm produces
one good (only) with constant marginal costs, a common denominator for
each of these variables is that they can be constructed from …rms’ revenues
pixi and variable costs cixi. Further, it is instructive to consider two cases:
one in which all …rms in the industry are observable, the other where only
a sample of …rms is observed. I use the following de…nition of a measure of
competition and a measure of competition in panel data sets.
De…nition 3 A variable m is called a measure of competition if it satis…es
both conditions (M) and (A) below. If m satis…es both (M) and (P) below it
is called a measure of competition in panel data sets.
9Allowing for both collusion and marginal costs which change with …rm’s output levels
can cause the following problems. Consider a cartel model where collusive and punishment
periods alternate, such as in Abreu (1986) or Porter (1983). The punishment phase is
more competitive than the collusive phase. Suppose that …rm i’s total variable costs equal
cixi + °ix
2
i . Hence, i’s marginal costs equal ci + 2°ixi. In the case where ci < cj but
°i > °j it is conceivable that in the collusive (low output) phase, the marginal costs of …rm
j exceed those of …rm i, while in the punishment (high output) phase it is the other way
around. Comparing the relative pro…ts of i and j in the two phases, which …rm is the less
e¢cient one? A related observation is that in the full collusion outcome with homogenous
goods, …rms’ marginal costs will be equalized. Such extensions are left for future research.
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(M) monotonicity: m is monotone in the parametrizations of competition in
table 1;
(A) observability: m can be derived from revenues and total variable costs of
each …rm fpixi; cixigi2A where A is the set of all …rms, A = f1; :::; ng;
(P) observability in panel data sets: m can be derived from revenues and
total variable costs of each …rm fpixi; cixigi2P where P is any strict subset
of f1; :::; ng consisting of at least two …rms.
The …rst requirement is natural. A necessary condition for a variable to
measure competition is that it is monotone in competition. That is, if one
increases competition through a change in a parameter of the model, the mea-
sure of competition should always increase (or always decrease). This allows
the interpretation of a change in this measure as a change in competition.10
The third requirement takes the following feature of panel data sets into
account.11 At each moment in time a panel data set only contains a subset of
the …rms in an industry. So one does not observe, say, total industry pro…ts,
but only the sum of pro…ts of …rms in the panel. Also, concentration can
only be measured as concentration within the panel.12 Although this seems
a reasonable assumption for panel data sets, one may argue that for any data
set it is the case that only a subset of the relevant …rms is observed. This
may be due to problems of the relevant market. Or due to the fact that …rms
or plants are classi…ed by their main activity not by each separate activity.
As shown below, the only variable that is a measure of competition but not
a measure of competition in panel data sets is the pro…ts of the least e¢cient
…rm in the market.
I analyze the e¤ect of competition on the seven variables summarized
in table 2. The notation used is the following. Firm i’s Nash equilibrium
price and output levels equal p(ci; c¡i; µ) and x(ci; c¡i; µ). Note that these
functions are not indexed by i, since …rms are completely symmetric except
for their marginal cost levels. To ease notation, Nash equilibrium price and
output levels are denoted by pi ´ p(ci; c¡i; µ) and xi ´ x(ci; c¡i; µ). Nash
equilibrium pro…ts of …rm i are de…ned as ¼(ci; c¡i; µ) ´ pixi ¡ cixi. I use
10Ideally, one would like to have a variable which increases if and only if competition is
raised. Strictly speaking, this is true for relative pro…ts in the examples above. However,
the examples are chosen for their analytical tractability and hence are parsimonious in
parameters. So the claim of the paper is that relative pro…ts rise if competition increases.
11Requirement (P) is stronger than (A), because under (P) one uses less information than
is allowed under (A). In other words, under (A) one can always drop some observations
and calculate m for only a subset of …rms.
12Note that it is sometimes possible to calculate concentration indices in a panel data
set using total industry revenues, because information on total revenues is available from
a separate source.
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the convention that a rise in µ denotes a rise in competition, as in example
2. If competition is parameterized as the conjectural variation ¸ in example
1, then µ is identi…ed as 1=¸.
RP relative pro…ts ¼(ci;c¡i;µ)
¼(cj ;c¡j ;µ)
where ci < cj
SP sum of pro…ts
P
i2O ¼(ci; c¡i; µ)
PLEF pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm ¼(cI ; c¡I ; µ) where cI ¸ ci for each i 2 O
RR relative revenues pixi
pjxj
where ci < cj
RV C relative variable costs cixi
cjxj
where ci < cj









where O is the set of observed …rms, that is O = f1; :::; ng under requirement (A)
and O ½ f1; :::; ng under requirement (P).
Table 2. Seven variables
All of the variables in table 2 are de…ned with respect to a set O of
observed …rms. Under requirement (A), it is the case that O = f1; :::; ng,
while under (P) the set O is a strict subset of all …rms f1; :::; ng. Note that
the ratios RP;RR and RV C are de…ned with the relatively e¢cient …rm in
the numerator and the relatively ine¢cient one in the denominator.
If competition is raised through a fall in entry barriers f which raises the
number of …rms in the market or a fall in a …rm’s marginal cost level, the
variables in table 2 should be interpreted as follows. If the number of …rms in
the market rises from n to n+ 1, the relative measures should be calculated
for any two …rms, except n+ 1. If …rm n+ 1 is the least e¢cient …rm in the
market, PLEF should be calculated for the next least e¢cient …rm. In the
sum-measures and the Her…ndahl index, …rm n+1 should be included under
requirement (A). Further, if competition is increased through a reduction in
…rm i’s marginal costs, the relative measures should be calculated for any
two …rms, except …rm i. Similarly, in this case the pro…ts of the least e¢cient
…rm should be calculated for the least e¢cient …rm, except i. Clearly, if i is
the least e¢cient …rm in the industry, reducing its marginal costs will raise
its pro…ts (in absolute value) and will raise its pro…ts relative to any other
…rm. Whether one includes …rm i or not in calculating the sum-measures
turns out to be irrelevant. As the next result shows the sum variables are
not monotone in competition anyway, irrespective of this decision.
Proposition 4 Of the seven variables in table 2, only RP , PLEF and RV C
are measures of competition. Moreover, RP and RV C are measures of com-
petition in panel data sets. RP is increasing and RV C is non-decreasing in
competition.
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Of course, the observation that RP and RV C are measures of competi-
tion follows immediately from the proposition that conjecture 1 holds in the
examples above. Since the conjecture is stated for any two …rms, there is no
need to observe all the …rms in the industry. Thus RP and RV C are mea-
sures of competition in panel data sets as well. This is di¤erent for PLEF .
Again, because conjecture 1 holds for all examples above,13 PLEF is a mea-
sure of competition. However, PLEF is not a measure of competition in
panel data sets. This follows from the fact that the sum of pro…ts, SP , is not
monotone in competition, which is proved in the appendix. Consequently, a
rise in competition can raise the sum of pro…ts. Thus it raises the pro…ts of
some …rms in the market, and the panel may consist of exactly these …rms.
The proof in the appendix gives one counterexample for each of the variables
that do not satisfy (M). That is, it shows by example that the variable can
rise with competition and that it can fall with competition. The next sec-
tion gives the intuition why the variables in table 2, with the exception of
RP;RV C and PLEF , are not monotone in competition.
5 Existing measures and their drawbacks
Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, lemma 5 in the appendix shows
that a rise in competition does not always reduce total industry pro…ts. If
all …rms have the same marginal cost level, a rise in competition does indeed
lower total industry pro…ts. However, if …rms di¤er in their marginal cost
levels the rise in competition reallocates output from ine¢cient …rms with a
low price cost margin to e¢cient …rms with a high price cost margin. In other
words, output is reallocated from …rms where output does not add much to
industry pro…ts to …rms where it contributes a lot to industry pro…ts. If the
latter e¤ect is strong enough, the rise in competition raises industry pro…ts.
Although a rise in competition always raises RP and RV C, it raises rel-
ative revenues RR in some cases but not in all.14 A rise in competition can
raise RR by reallocating output from ine¢cient to e¢cient …rms, while leav-
ing relative prices between …rms unchanged. For instance, if …rms produce
homogenous goods the relative price equals pi
pj
= 1 and does not change with
competition. The intuition why a rise in competition reduces RR, can be
13That is, with the upperbounds on ¸ and b.
14Recall from the introduction that Hay and Liu (1997) use RR as a way to measure
competition.
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where it is the case that ci < cj and ¼i is shorthand notation for ¼(ci; c¡i; µ).
That is, relative revenues RR can be written as a weighted average of relative
pro…ts RP and relative variable costs RV C. The weight on relative pro…ts
® can be written as the price cost margin of the relatively ine¢cient …rm
j, pj¡cj
pj





competition. Hence if ® does not vary (much), relative revenues rise as well
with competition. Relative revenues fall with competition if the price cost
margin of the relative high cost …rm j falls because of the rise in competition,




. This last condition can be rewritten as






. So if the fall in the price cost margin of …rm j is big enough




, a rise in competition reduces relative
revenues RR. This non-monotonicity of RR is proved in lemma 6 in the
appendix. Summarizing, a rise in competition can reallocate revenues or
market share from ine¢cient to e¢cient …rms, but this is not necessarily
always the case.
Although in examples 3, 4 and 5 a rise in competition reduces each …rm’s
price cost margin this is not always the case. As shown in lemma 7 in the
appendix for a duopoly case, a rise in competition may raise the price cost
margin of the most e¢cient …rm, if its cost level is far lower than that of its
opponent.15 ;16 The intuition is that the rise in competition marginalizes the
ine¢cient …rm. This creates the opportunity for the e¢cient …rm to raise its
price level (while keeping it below the price of the less e¢cient …rm), since
customers are not buying from the ine¢cient …rm anyway.
As noted by Tirole (1988: 223) and proved in lemma 8, concentration
is not monotone in competition. This is clearly the case if competition is
raised through more aggressive interaction between …rms. Because such a
rise in competition can reallocate revenues from the ine¢cient to the e¢cient
15The result that a rise in competition can raise prices is not new. Stiglitz (1989) gives
an example where a rise in competition through a rise in the number of …rms in the market
raises …rms’ prices.
16There also seems to be some empirical support for this possibility. Goldberg and
Knetter (1995) estimate the elasticity of residual demand faced by German beer exporters
in …ve countries, using exchange rate shocks. This elasticity is interpreted as a measure
of competition. They …nd that German beer exporters charge the highest prices in the
market where they face the most intense competition.
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…rms, it raises concentration. This follows from the fact that e¢cient …rms
have already higher market shares to start with,17 thus reallocating more
revenues to them raises the Her…ndahl index. A fall in concentration correctly
indicates a rise in competition if there is entry into the market. However,
lemma 8 also shows that this does not hold under requirement (P). That is,
entry may lead to a rise in observed concentration in a panel data set. The
intuition is again the reallocation e¤ect. Suppose an additional …rm enters
into an industry, but this new …rm is not (yet) in the panel of observed
…rms. This rise in competition reallocates market shares among the observed
…rms in the panel. In particular, the ine¢cient …rms in the panel experience
a bigger fall in revenues than the e¢cient …rms. Consequently, observed
concentration rises in the panel. In other words, in a panel data set a rise in
competition through more aggressive interaction or through entry into the
industry can lead to a rise in observed concentration.
6 Relative pro…ts: discussion
As shown above, the variable RP is monotone in competition, at least for a
number of parametrizations of competition. This is an important …rst step
towards …nding common ground in the di¤erent ways that economists have
modelled competition. Next, given the observation in the introduction that
the theoretical and empirical literature contradict each other on the topic of
competition, can the relative pro…ts measure bridge the gap?
In other words, given the theoretical robustness of relative pro…ts and
the result that it is a measure of competition in panel data sets, can it be
used as an indicator of competition in an empirical sense? Here, I brie‡y
mention three problems which one encounters when using RP as a measure
of competition in practice. In particular, I discuss the consequences of the
unobservability of marginal costs, an (unobserved) unlevel playing …eld and
problems with de…ning the relevant market. The upshot of this discussion
is that comparing competition between industries using relative pro…ts is
nonsense because of these problems. However, if one can argue that in a
17This was already noted in the discussion on the pro…tability-concentration relation.
See for instance Clarke et al. (1984) and Tirole (1988: 223). One explanation of the
positive correlation between concentration and pro…tability is that with fewer …rms in
the industry it is easier to collude and raise pro…ts. Another explanation, put forward by
Demsetz, is the following. If some …rms have a strong e¢ciency advantage over their rivals,
this will raise their pro…ts and industry concentration. The point of my paper is that a
rise in competition, say due to a reduction in the conjectural variation, can strengthen
this Demsetz e¤ect. In particular, such a rise in competition can raise the market share
and pro…ts of the most e¢cient …rms at the expense of less e¢cient ones.
19
certain industry the extent of these problems has not changed over time,
then relative pro…ts can be used to monitor competition over time within
this industry.
A simple way to implement relative pro…ts RP as a measure of competi-










where …rm 1 is used to normalize pro…ts and marginal costs and i 2 O indexes
the other …rms that are observed in the industry. For concreteness, assume
that …rm 1 is the …rm with the lowest marginal costs of the observed …rms.
That is, ci ¸ c1 for each observed …rm i. In general, this relation will be
downward sloping, that is ¯¼c < 0. Firms with higher marginal costs have
lower pro…ts. As above, pro…ts are de…ned as revenues minus variable costs,
¼(ci; c¡i; µ) = pixi¡cixi and ¼i is used as short hand notation for ¼(ci; c¡i; µ).
The intuition for the slope ¯
¼c
is the following. It measures to which
extent the cost gap ci
c1
is mapped into a pro…t di¤erential ¼i
¼1
. In a very
competitive (not competitive) industry, e¢ciency di¤erences ci
c1
are mapped
into big (small) pro…t di¤erences; that is ¯¼c is big (small) in absolute value.
Three problems one encounters when using (16) in practice are the follow-
ing. First, as argued, for instance by Bresnahan (1989), a major problem in
applied industrial economics is that relevant concepts are not readily observ-
able. In particular, marginal costs ci and pro…ts de…ned as revenues minus
variable costs, ¼i ´ pixi ¡ cixi, are not readily observable. Measurement
errors in these variables may cause biased estimation results in (16).18
Second, consider the following example of an (unobserved) unlevel playing
…eld. As noted in Bishop (2000: 10), online retailers in the US do not charge
their customers any sales tax, while traditional high street stores do collect
the sales tax. Let …rm a denote the online …rm and b the high street store, and
let ca and cb denote their respective marginal production costs. Now suppose
that the researcher trying to estimate equation (16) does not add the sales
tax t to the marginal costs of …rm b; for instance, because he classi…es the
taxes paid by the …rm as a …xed cost, or does not observe taxes at all. Then
the e¤ect of an unobserved change in the playing …eld t on the estimated
slope ¯¼c is the following. If ca < cb then increasing t raises the relative
pro…ts ¼a
¼b
for given observed marginal production costs. Hence the estimated
slope ¯¼c increases in absolute value. This would be interpreted as a rise in
18Another potential cause of bias is that …rms’ marginal cost levels are endogenously
determined by …rms’ decisions on, say, R&D. If R&D decisions are a¤ected by competition,
simply estimating equation (16) yields biased results.
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competition. However making the playing …eld less even is usually seen as a
reduction in competition. If, on the other hand, ca > cb then the (unobserved)
rise in t reduces the estimated slope in absolute value. Summarizing, if the
playing …eld is made unlevel in favour of the most e¢cient …rms (while this
is not observed), this gives the incorrect impression that competition has
increased. If the playing …eld is made unlevel in favour of the least e¢cient
…rms, observed competition is reduced.
Finally, de…ning the relevant market is known to be a di¢cult problem.
With a measure like concentration one can err in two directions. With too
broad a de…nition of the market, concentration is too low and overestimates
the degree of the competition. With too narrow a de…nition of the market,
concentration is too high and underestimates the extent of competition. One
can argue that with the indicator based on relative pro…ts, the main problem
is too broad a de…nition of the relevant market. In particular, condition
(P) in de…nition 3 implies that relative pro…ts still measure the extent of
competition if only a subset of …rms in the market is observed. In this sense,
too narrow a de…nition of competition is not necessarily a problem. But
if the de…nition of the market is too broad, the estimated indicator may
overestimate or underestimate the true extent of competition depending on
the relative cost and pro…t ratios of the added …rms. Thus one can argue
that the problem of de…ning the relevant market can be partly solved for the
indicator ¯¼c by choosing only the …rms which are without doubt operating
in the market under consideration.
Each of these problems prevents inter-industry comparisons of competi-
tion using relative pro…ts. If the slope in (16) is steeper in industry A than
in B, this may for instance be because (i) measurement errors with respect
to marginal costs reduce the observed dispersion of marginal costs in A more
than in B, (ii) the playing …eld is particularly unlevel in favour of the most
e¢cient …rm in A and (iii) some of the …rms observed under B are in fact not
on the relevant market and they reduce the estimated slope ¯¼c. Since these
problems cannot be quanti…ed, one cannot correct for them in a meaningful
way.
However, more can be said about the change in competition over time
within a certain industry. If relation (16) becomes steeper over time within
industry A and if one can argue that the problems mentioned above have
not changed over time in A, then this can be interpreted as evidence that
competition in A rises over time.
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7 Literature on measures of competition
In the empirical literature, competition is often measured with variables like
concentration, rents, price cost margins and import penetration (see for in-
stance, Shepherd (1982), Domowitz et al. (1986), Blundell et al. (1995, 1999)
and Nickell (1996)). As argued above, the …rst three variables are not mono-
tone in competition. The same is true for import penetration as can be seen
as follows. A rise in import penetration, say through a reduction in trade
barriers, increases competition on the domestic market. But more aggressive
interaction on the domestic market may cause a fall in import penetration
if home producers are more e¢cient than foreign ones. Although these vari-
ables are not monotone in competition, they have the advantage that they
are relatively straightforward to calculate.
As surveyed by Bresnahan (1989), there are the structural and non-
parametric approaches to measuring competition. Both approaches usually
model the industry as a representative …rm and try to identify a conjectural
variation parameter. Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) were the …rst to show
that di¤erent hypotheses about conduct have di¤erent implications for the
comparative statics of industry price and quantity with respect to demand
and supply shocks. The structural approach estimates the demand curve
a (representative) …rm faces, its cost curve and a supply curve. Examples
are Bresnahan (1987), Porter (1983) and Wolfram (1999). The main prob-
lem with this method is misspeci…cation. The estimate of the conjectural
variation parameter is sensitive to how, say, the cost curve is speci…ed.
The non-parametric approaches of, for instance, Panzar and Rosse (1987)
and Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987), are more general in the sense that they
use revealed preference arguments which hold for any demand and cost func-
tion. In particular, Panzar and Rosse (1987) estimate a reduced form revenue
equation where among the independent variables are factor prices of the in-
dustry’s inputs. Then they calculate a statistic Ã which equals the sum of
elasticities of revenue with respect to factor prices. They show that monopoly
implies Ã  0, (long run) monopolistic competition implies Ã  1 and per-
fect competition implies Ã = 1. This is a general approach, but cannot be
used to see how competition changes. To illustrate, if in a certain industry Ã
increases from ¡0:75 to 0:5 either competition increased from monopoly to
monopolistic competition or it has stayed under monopolistic competition, in
which case competition has not necessarily increased. In this approach there
is the following misspeci…cation problem. How should the relation between
revenues and factor prices be speci…ed; linear, log-linear or otherwise? The
indicator proposed here has the same problem. For instance, equation (16)
speci…es a linear relation between relative pro…ts and relative e¢ciency. But
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there is no reason to expect this relation to be linear in practice.
Also in this vein is Hall’s (1988) instrument test of the joint hypothesis
of perfect competition and constant returns to scale production technology.
Hall shows that under this hypothesis, the Solow residual in an industry is
uncorrelated with instrumental variables like military spending and the oil
price. The problem is that in an industry where this hypothesis is rejected,
nothing can be said about whether competition increases or decreases. To
say more about competition in this case, Hall estimates the mark up ratio
(price over marginal costs) for an industry and uses this as a measure of
market power. One problem with this approach is that the mark up ratio
is not monotone in competition. Second, as argued by Shapiro (1987), the
mark up ratio should be corrected for the market elasticity of demand to
derive a measure of competition. Third, as shown by Domowitz et al. (1988)
the estimated mark ups are sensitive to the way marginal costs are mea-
sured. Similarly, the relative pro…ts measure, proposed here, is sensitive to
measurement problems with respect to marginal costs.
Summarizing, one can say that when using measures of competition in
practice, one faces the following trade o¤. On the one hand, there are mea-
sures like concentration and industry pro…ts which are relatively easy to cal-
culate, but not monotone in competition. On the other hand, there are the
structural and non-parametric approaches which are better grounded in the-
ory but harder to calculate in practice. The relative pro…ts measure clearly
belongs to the latter category. However, it remains an empirical question
to which extent these measures of competition yield di¤erent conclusions in
practice.19
8 Conclusion
This paper has argued that relative pro…ts are monotone in competition for
a number of well known parametrizations of competition. The idea is that a
given rise in marginal costs (relative to a …rm’s opponents) leads to a bigger
fall in pro…ts in a more competitive industry. This is a …rst step towards
the theoretical goal of a better understanding of what di¤erent competition
parametrizations have in common.
On the empirical goal of measuring competition in practice, estimating
to which extent cost di¤erences are translated into pro…t di¤erences has the
19A simple way to test this is to examine how closely correlated di¤erent indicators are
over industries and time periods. Alternatively, one could opt for a simulation approach,
as in Hyde and Perlo¤ (1995), to get a quantative feel of the di¤erences between these
measures of competition.
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advantage that not all …rms in the industry need to be observed. There are
several problems with this measure which seem to preclude inter-industry
comparisons of competition. I discussed an unlevel playing …eld and mea-
surement problems with respect to pro…ts and marginal costs. However, if
one can argue that within a certain industry the bias caused by these prob-
lems has not changed over time, a change in the indicator can be interpreted
as a change in competition in this industry.
Some people may wonder why nothing has been said here about the
relation between competition and welfare. The reason is that there is no
monotone relation between competition and welfare. This point has been
formalized by Mankiw and Whinston (1986). They show that there are two
externalities when …rms decide whether or not to enter an industry. First,
there is the appropriability e¤ect which leads to too little entry in the private
outcome. Second, there is the business stealing e¤ect which leads to excessive
entry. Using the number of …rms as a parametrization of competition, one
…nds the following relation between competition and welfare. If the appro-
priability e¤ect exceeds the business stealing e¤ect, there are too few …rms in
the industry. Increasing the number of entrants raises both competition and
welfare. However, if the business stealing e¤ect exceeds the appropriability
e¤ect, reducing the number of entrants decreases competition and increases
welfare.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of the claims made in the counterexam-
ple in section 2 and of proposition 2. Further it contains a number of lemmas
showing that the variables in table 2, with the exception of RP;RV C and
PLEF , are not monotone in competition.
Proof of counterexample in section 2
Firm 2; taking x1 as given, chooses x2 to solve
max
x2
(1¡ x2 ¡ µx1 ¡ c2)x2
It follows that x2 = 12(1 ¡ µx1 ¡ c2) and ¼2 = 14(1 ¡ µx1 ¡ c2)2. Firm 1,






(1¡ µx1 ¡ c2)¡ c1)x1
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1¡ c1 ¡ µ2(1¡ c2)

















1¡ c1 ¡ µ(1¡c2)2
2¡ µ2 + µ
¡ (1¡c2)(2¡µ2)
2
+ 2µ(1¡ c1 ¡ µ(1¡c2)2 )
(2¡ µ2)2
=







(1¡ µx1 ¡ c2)
(2 + µ2)(1¡ c1)¡ 2µ(1¡ c2)
(2¡ µ2)2




Proof of proposition 2
First, I prove that the pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm are decreasing in
competition for all of the examples (part (i) of conjecture 1). Then I prove
that relative pro…ts and relative variable costs are monotone in competition
for all examples (parts (ii) and (iii) of the conjecture).
Proof of part (i) of conjecture 1:
ÄExample 1:
If ¸ falls then the pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm in the market, denoted
I, fall. It follows from equation (3) that
@¼I
@¸
= dx2I + 2(b+ ¸d)xI
@xI
@¸
Using equation (2), this can be written as
@¼I
@¸
















where the denominator D is de…ned as D ´ (2b
d
+ ¸¡ 1)(2b+ d(¸+ n¡ 1)).













+ ¸¡ 1)2(2b+ d(¸+ n¡ 1)) + xI
µ
d¡ 2(b+ ¸d)
2b+ d(¸+ n¡ 1)
¶!
The …rst term on the right hand side is positive because …rm I is the least
e¢cient …rm in the market, and thus has above average costs. The second
term is positive if ¸ is not too big. This de…nes the upperbound ¹̧ for ¸.
For the analysis of the parametrization b
d
on the variable PLEF , it turns
out to be instructive to look at the e¤ects of b and d separately. The e¤ect
of b on the pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm, ¼I , is the same as the e¤ect of
¸. This can be seen as follows. For given value of d, the parameters ¸ and b
enter the expressions for pro…ts (3) and output (2) symmetrically.
If 1
d
falls then the pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm, ¼I , decrease.





















































where the denominator is again de…ned as D ´ (2b
d
+¸¡1)(2b+d(¸+n¡1)).
To prove that the overall e¤ect of 1
d
on ¼I is positive, I use the following
substitution, introducing a parameter Á.







where Á ¸ 1 because …rm I’s output level is nonnegative. This follows from





































(1¡ Á) + 2b
d
+ ¸+ n¡ 1
¸¶














































Hence I …nd that @¼I
@( 1d)
> 0.
The observation that pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm I fall as a falls, is
immediate by looking at equations (3) and (2).
The observation that pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm I fall as cj (with
j 6= I) falls, is immediate by looking at equations (3) and (2).
Finally, I show that a rise in the number of …rms in the market from n to
n+1 reduces the pro…ts ¼I of the least e¢cient …rm I in the market. Where
I is de…ned by cI ¸ cj for each j 2 f1; :::; ng but it is not necesarily the case
that cI ¸ cn+1. It follows from the expression for pro…ts (3) that the pro…ts
of I with n + 1 …rms are lower than with n …rms if and only if the output
level of I is lower with n + 1 …rms. Using equation (2), output of …rm I is



























































which is satis…ed because …rm n+1 produces a positive output level. Hence
the pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm I fall as the number of …rms in the market
rise.
ÄExample 2:
The least e¢cient …rm, is the one with the cost gap c > 1. Hence I have
to show that @¼(c;µ)
@µ
< 0 for c > 1. Di¤erentiating the expression for ¼(c; µ)







([ln c][1 + µ + (1¡ µ)cµ] + 1 + cµ
¢
which is clearly negative for c > 1.
ÄExample 3:
With c2 > c1 it is the case that the least e¢cient …rm 2 makes zero
pro…ts under Bertrand competition, while it makes positive pro…ts under
Cournot competition. Hence raising competition by switching from Cournot
to Bertrand competition reduces the pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm.
ÄExample 4:










Then it follows, from the observation that cI
cj
¸ 1 for each j, that a rise in
competition µ reduces I’s pro…ts.
ÄExample 5:
It follows from the expression for pro…ts (15) that
@¼
@µ
= ¡(3 + µ(cj ¡ ci))(3 + µ(ci ¡ cj))
18µ2
< 0
because both …rms produce a positive output level. Hence a rise in compe-
tition µ reduces both …rms’ pro…ts.
Proof of parts (ii) and (iii) of conjecture:
ÄExample 1:












































































< 0 if and only if (ci ¡ ck) < 0. In words, a rise in
competition through a fall in ¸ increases …rm i’s relative pro…ts if and only
if i’s cost level is below k’s cost level.









































Then one …nds that a rise in competition raises …rm i’s relative pro…ts if and
only if i’s cost level is below k’s cost level.
Consider the e¤ects of a for given number of …rms in the industry n. Then









































In words, a rise in a, for given n, increases the relative pro…ts of …rm i if it
has higher costs than k.
Finally decreasing
Pn
j=1 cj through a reduction in cj a¤ects the ratio of pro…ts







































Hence a rise in competition through a fall in
Pn
j=1 cj raises i’s relative pro…ts
if and only if i’s costs are lower than k’s costs.
The entryfee f has only an e¤ect on market shares if the reduction in f leads
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to more entry. So the e¤ect of a reduction in f is considered directly as the






the cost level of the new entrant. The relative pro…ts of two …rms i; k 6= n+1































































> 0 (because n + 1’s
output level is positive), it follows that a rise in competition, through a rise
in n, raises …rm i’s relative pro…ts if and only if i’s cost level is below k’s cost
level.































+ ¸+ n¡ 1
¢
ck
It is routine to verify that the signs of the partial derivatives of cixi
ckxk
with



















1 + (1¡ µ)cµ
1 + (1¡ µ)c¡µ =
c¡µ + 1¡ µ
cµ + 1¡ µ










c¡µ ¡ cµ ¡ ln(c)[2 + (1¡ µ)(c¡µ + cµ)]
(cµ + 1¡ µ)2
which is positive if and only if c < 1. Hence a rise in competition increases
the relative pro…ts of the most e¢cient …rm.





thus competition has no e¤ect on the relative variable cost shares.
ÄExample 3:
(ii): Holds trivially as ¼B2 = 0.
(iii): Holds trivially as xB2 = 0.
ÄExample 4:









This implies that a rise in competition µ raises the relative pro…ts of the low
cost …rm.









which is increasing in µ if and only if i is the low cost …rm.
ÄExample 5:
(ii): Using equation (15) one can write the relative pro…ts as
¼(ci; cj; µ)
¼(cj ; ci; µ)
=
3 + µ (cj ¡ ci)
3 + µ (ci ¡ cj)
Hence it is immediately clear that a rise in competition µ raises the relative
pro…ts of the low cost …rm.






3 + µ(cj ¡ ci)
3¡ µ(cj ¡ ci)
which is increasing in µ if ci < cj.¥
Proof of proposition 4:
The proof that RP and RV C satisfy (M), (A) and (P) follows from
proposition 2. Similarly, proposition 2 implies that PLEF satis…es (M) and
(A). Finally the proof that the other variables in table 2 do not satisfy (M)
follows from lemma 5 - lemma 8 below.¥
Lemma 5 In example 3 SP is both increasing and decreasing in competition
modelled as a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition.
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Remark : The same is true for competition as parametrized by µ in ex-
ample 2.
Proof. Using equation (7) with µ = 1 the sum of pro…ts for Cournot





















¼B1 if c1 is far smaller than c2.
Lemma 6 In example 1 RR is both increasing and decreasing in competition
as parameterized by ¸.
Proof. Consider the following parameter values: c1 = 1, c2 = 2, b = 1,
d = 0:4, n = 5 and
P5
j=1 cj = 5. Then one can show, using equations (2)
























Note that in both cases the pro…ts of the least e¢cient …rm 2 are increasing
in ¸ at ¸ = 0:5. That is, ¸ = 0:5 is below the upperbound ¹̧ derived in the
proof of proposition 2
Lemma 7 In example 2 PCM is both increasing and decreasing in compe-
tition as parametrized by µ.







where c = ci
cj
measures the cost gap between …rms i and j. Since the price















< 0 for the high cost …rm (c > 1) but @pcmi
@µ
> 0 is possible for
the low cost …rm (c < 1).
Lemma 8 In example 1 H is increasing in competition as measured by ¸.
H can be decreasing in competition as measured by n if all …rms can be
observed, that is under requirement (A). However, H can be increasing in n
under requirement (P).
Remark : H is also increasing in competition as parameterized by b
d
in
example 1, by a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition in example 3
and as parameterized by µ in examples 4 and 5.
Proof. For simplicity, consider the case where goods are perfect substi-
tutes, that is b = d. Then all …rms charge the same price and …rm i’s market
share equals xiPn
j=1 xj






(2 + ¸¡ 1) a+Pnj=1 cj ¡ (2 + ¸+ n¡ 1) ci






equals the average cost level in the industry. Now consider
the e¤ect of ¸ on the market share of …rm i, xiPn
j=1 xj
, for given number of















(2 + ¸¡ 1) a+Pnj=1 cj ¡ (2 + ¸+ n¡ 1) ¹c
i2 (19)
Hence, a rise in competition, through a fall in ¸, increases …rm i’s market
share if and only if i’s cost level is below the average cost level, ci < ¹c .
That is, the rise in competition increases the market share of the big …rms
and reduces the market share of the small …rms. This leads to a rise in H.
Note that this holds for any ¸, so in particular for values of ¸ below the
upperbound ¹̧ derived in the proof of proposition 2.
To show that H can be decreasing in competition as parameterized by n,
consider the case where all …rms have the same marginal cost level. Then
…rm i’s market share equals 1
n




which is indeed decreasing in n.
Now consider the e¤ect of n on H in a panel P of …rms. Increasing n leads
to an additional …rm with cost level cn+1. Assume that the new …rm n+1 is
not in the panel, that is the set P is unchanged. Then the observed market
share of …rm i equals xiP
j2P xj













(2 + ¸¡ 1) a+Pn+1j=1 cj ¡ (2 + ¸+ n) cn+1
i
h
(2 + ¸¡ 1) a+Pnj=1 cj ¡ (2 + ¸+ n¡ 1) ¹cP
i2
(20)
where jP j is the number of …rms in the panel and ¹cP equals the average cost




















(because n+1’s output level is positive), it follows that a rise in competition,
through a rise in n, raises …rm i’s observed market share if and only if i’s
cost level is below the average cost level in the sample P . This is again
an instance of the reallocation e¤ect of competition. Hence the rise in n
reallocates market share from ine¢cient …rms in the panel to the e¢cient
ones and thus raises the observed Her…ndahl index in the panel.
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